This Chapter analyzes the current discourse on the legality of autonomous weapons ('killer robots') 
INTRODUCTION
The question of 'killer robots,' or autonomous weapon systems (AWS), has garnered much attention in recent discourse. While officials often downplay the prospect of such systems making targeting and other crucial decisions, their own statements reveal the possibility that such capabilities would be developed in the near future.
1 For instance, in late 2012, the US Department of Defense (DoD)
imposed a de facto moratorium on the development of fully AWS, by emphasizing that weapons 'shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.' 2 From the mere fact that the DoD felt the need to constrain the development and use of AWS for the time being, in several ways, 3 we can learn that the prospect of such weapons is realistic. Indeed, the DoD Directive itself includes a bypass clause in which deviations from its requirements can be approved by high-ranking officials through special procedures. 4 There is therefore a consensus, among commentators, that the motivation to develop and deploy AWS will overcome these temporary constraints. 5 This makes the discussion of AWS a timely one.
When discussing the legality and legitimacy of such weapons, the claim that machines should not be making 'decisions' to use lethal force during armed conflict is an intuition shared by many. However, the current discussion as to just why this is so is rather unsatisfying. The ongoing discourse on AWS is comprised of nuanced approaches found between two extremes, arguing against each other roughly along consequentialist and deontological lines. On one side of the spectrum is the approach that if AWS could deliver good results, in terms of the interests protected by international humanitarian law (IHL), there is no reason to ban them. On the contrary: as the argument goes, if we take humanitarian considerations seriously, we should encourage the development and use of such weapons. Of course, proponents of this approach envision technological advancements that would actually make such results possible. Found on the other side of the spectrum, are those that claim that even if AWS could, in terms of outcomes, adhere to the basic norms of IHL, their use should still be prohibited, whether on ethical or legal grounds. Usually, those holding this position are also skeptical that technology would ever be able to produce such benevolent systems.
The discussion, thus, is caught in a loop of utilitarian arguments and deontological retorts. In essence, the current debate on AWS is a manifestation of the circular argument between technological optimists and pessimists found in other contexts. 6 In this Chapter, we do not attempt to prove any approach within this spectrum 'wrong. ' We likewise do not aim to propose all-encompassing solutions to the problem of AWS. Rather, we aim to suggest a framework that explains better some of the objections to such weapons. We suggest, therefore, another prism through which the question should be analyzed: one flowing from an administrative perception of warfare. In essence, we offer to approach the emerging phenomenon of AWS as an exercise of state power against individuals through a computerized proxy: as such, we suggest analyzing such interactions according to basic notions of administrative law, chiefly the obligation to exercise proper administrative discretion.
This understanding bridges between the administrative (or regulatory) realm, on the one hand, and the realm of warfare, on the other. Although, as we will point out, modern IHL already includes an administrative law aspect in its rules concerning target selection and the need to take 'constant care' to spare the 6 See in another context, J.E. Krier and C.P. civilian population, that aspect has never been explicitly articulated -and hence the two realms were traditionally viewed as unconnected. As we see it, the administrative law view becomes apparent when discussing the legality of AWS, as it provides the missing link between some objections to AWS, and the question of how sovereigns should act during armed conflict. Specifically, the administrative perception can explain why notions of 'due process' or 'procedural justice' -which are usually reserved to peacetime relations between a state and its citizenry -can be relevant also to the relations between belligerents (and between them and civilians) during armed conflict, and thus affect the legality of the use of AWS. As we claim, administrative law thinking is not simply another way to argue for the application of international human rights law (IHRL) during armed conflict, although these realms are mutually reinforcing. Rather, administrative law adds to the our understanding of human rights, by its emphasis on the proper process of decision rather than simply on the outcome of the decision making.
Discussing the issue of AWS through the administrative prism can thus assist us to understand better and articulate existing objections to AWS, and can serve as an interpretive or complementing source of principles when analyzing positive IHL and IHRL. Importantly, this approach allows us to assess the issue of AWS even under the assumption that such weapons could, in due time, perform reasonably, in terms of immediate results.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I defines autonomy for the sake of our discussion, laying down the distinction between 'technical' and 'substantive' autonomy. Part II outlines the 'circular' debate on AWS, caught between the instrumentalist and deontological discourses. Part III suggests analyzing the problem of AWS through the prism of administrative law, which exposes key problems relating to their use -both in relation to civilians and, perhaps -and here we make a preliminary argument -also to enemy combatants. Namely, we argue that owing to the administrative-legal duty to exercise constant discretion, the final decision to use lethal force must be taken by a human being in real time; and that furthermore, AWS may present a significant problem by diminishing the option of surrender.
I. TECHNICAL VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE AUTONOMY
Before we delve into our analysis, it is needed to define what we mean when referring to autonomous weapons. Indeed, as evident from the recent meeting of the CCW High Contracting Parties on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, any attempt to offer an elaborate definition is slippery, and in any case likely to be highly technical. 7 Since autonomy is a spectrum rather than an absolute term, 8 discussing autonomy without offering a simplified definition is like aiming at a moving target. For the purpose of this work, thus, we offer a simple working distinction between substantive and technical autonomy, and focus on our analysis strictly on the latter.
Substantive autonomy assumes machines with complete 'sentient'
abilities. If the prospect of such machines was our point of departure, our discussion would quickly cross the lines to a philosophical debate concerning the essential components of humanity. Are sentient machines robots or quasihumans? If they are, are their grounds to treat them differently in terms of law?
We leave such questions to others. 9 Likewise, our analysis is not concerned with 'Singularity' scenarios, 10 in which humanity and technology become enmeshed, nor with apocalyptic 'Terminator'-type debacles where machines become the dominant 'life form' on Earth. 11 In this Chapter we are concerned with reasonably foreseeable developments, which assume an interim perception of technical autonomy. compare Asaro, 'On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems', 699 ('The empirical question is whether a computer, machine, or automated process could make each of these decisions of life and death and achieve some performance that is deemed acceptable. But the moral question is whether a computer, machine or automated process ought to make these decisions of life and death at all. Unless we can prove in principle that a machine should not make such decisions, we are left to wonder if or when some clever programmers might be able to devise a computer system that can do these things').
consequentialist reasoning, focusing on the possible results of the deployment of AWS.
Thus, instrumental supporters of AWS point out the fact that if done right, autonomous technology will be much better than humans in alleviating death and suffering at war. 36 Indeed, excluding human beings from the battle ground will diminish the need for 'force protection,' which might in turn lower collateral damage inflicted on civilians. 37 In any case, the circular debate goes on and on.
Confronting the optimistic assumptions regarding future technology, pessimists claim that relying on technological hypotheticals, should not inform our normative debate today.
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On the legal level, Schmitt and Thurnher offer a robust instrumental defense of AWS, arguing that there is nothing per se unlawful in the process of autonomous targeting, assuming that their deployment and results correspond with IHL. As they claim, it is possible to envision algorithms that apply the principle of distinction, and are flexible enough to reasonably perform complex proportionality calculations. 39 Emphasizing outcomes, they remind us that humans, too, are less than perfect in applying IHL's difficult standards.
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However, they too concede that in the near future there is no choice but leaving the 'proportionality decision' -and other complex determinations -to humans. This human involvement, however, can be manifested in the mere decision to deploy the system in specific circumstances. 41 Therefore, a substantive discussion of AWS must transcend the circular and speculative discourse regarding their ability to deliver end results.
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The instrumental arguments concerning AWS talk beyond each other not only with regard to future technology, but also concerning the putative effects of 'human nature' on battlefield outcomes. Interestingly, instrumentalists that support AWS are as pessimistic regarding human conduct as they are optimistic about technology's power; while those that are pessimistic regarding technology romanticize human behavior on the battlefield. Thus, the optimists claim that humanity will be better off with AWS, since the latter would be immune to negative aspects of the human psyche such as tendency for revenge, prejudice or sadism, 46 as well as to natural fear and panic that can result in material risk to civilians. 47 As phrased by McGinnis, it is 'mistaken' to assume that artificial intelligence would 'worsen, rather than temper, human malevolence.' 48 However, pessimists are quick to retort that the elimination of the human factor from the field does not only neutralize adverse human traits, but also positive ones such as common sense or compassion, which might allow humans to act mercifully even 43 Some argue that due to the sheer complexity of modern computing 'no individual can predict the effect of a given command with absolute uncertainty. ' when they could lawfully kill. 49 Paradoxically, both pessimists and optimists disregard the fact that human nature -whether good or bad -is also behind the development of technology itself, which can therefore (potentially) either reflect humanity's benevolence or its malevolence.
It becomes clear that as always, assumptions about human nature are mutually-offsetting and are likely to remain inconclusive, 50 and thus cannot carry the debate forward. Thus, any attempt to decide whether the elimination of negative human traits from the battlefield is instrumentally positive, in terms of immediate results, is speculative and prone to arbitrariness.
B. The Deontological Discourse
The second level of the debate on AWS is concerned with deontological ethics. Arguments of this order posit that even if AWS could overcome the instrumental concerns discussed above -a possibility concerning which deontologists are of course pessimistic -and could therefore, in terms of results, perform well in relation to the values that IHL sets out to protect -there is still something inherently wrong in subjecting humans to machine-made 'decisions' to use lethal force.
At large, the deontological arguments are variations of two basic claims.
The first has to do with the nature of war, and specifically the expectation that it would involve some element of mutual risk: as the argument goes, in order to distinguish it from one-sided killing, war must involve some measure of self- 59 Ibid., 700. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid., 700 -701. This is because according to Asaro, the essence of due process is 'the right to question the rules and appropriateness of their application in a given circumstance, and to make an appeal to informed human rationality and understanding.' Ibid., 700.
why AWS might jeopardize concepts of procedural justice such as due process; but they do not tell us why these are relevant, as such, in situations of warfare. individuals even when control over territory is not complete. 83 States have been expected to act as benevolent administrators even without boots on the ground, at least in relation to the functions they control vis-à-vis the civilian population. 84 In our context, when making a targeting decision, a state agent is making a life and death decision regarding an individual. As such, the process of targeting represents a form of control par excellence, even if not always accepted as such in positive international law concerning accumulation of jurisdiction. 85 However, we do not have to adopt a radical perception of control in order to ground the existence of administrative-like duties during warfare. This is since complementing the expanding notion of control is an evolving perception of sovereignty itself. As we suggest, this transformation is from a view of sovereignty as a 'trusteeship' of certain body-politic, to trusteeship of humanity at large. The concept of sovereignty as trusteeship of humanity, its justifications -as well as its possible critiques -were expounded elsewhere. 86 Here we shall only outline its basic (and relevant) aspects.
The gist of this approach is that states should bear a residual obligation to take other-regarding considerations in their decision-making processes; and that in fact, this idea is increasingly reflected in international law. 87 The appeal of this approach lies in ever-growing interdependence. This interdependence means that sovereigns' decisions concerning development, natural resources or -in fact -any type of regulation, no longer affect only the polity of the territorial state, but also lives of individuals in other states: power and its effects are no longer aligned. 88 Put simply, the perception of sovereignty as a global trust rests upon the notion that those who exercise power bear responsibility, even if the results affect those found beyond borders. It is, in its essence, a corollary of the idea of the equal moral worth of all, but also can be justified on perceptions of global welfare and justice. 89 However, from considerations both normative as well as practical, global trusteeship does not call for the eradication of the state in favor of a cosmopolitan utopia of world-federation, nor does it require that states relinquish their selfinterest altogether. It merely recognizes a pragmatic administrative-legal notion, according to which a sovereign's decision-making process must take effects over others seriously. 90 Importantly, since this responsibility is inherent in the concept of sovereignty, it applies to every exercise of sovereign power, independent of specific treaty obligations. 91 Thus, global trusteeship spawns several minimal obligations which are firmly rooted in traditional notions of administrative law.
Relevant to our context are the obligation to take others' interests into account (including human dignity), which implies a duty to exercise discretion when sovereign actions bear cross-border effects.
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Thus, the mere fact that a certain armed conflict crosses national borders does not, in itself, negate diagonal-administrative responsibilities, even when traditional effective control is absent. How could this understanding affect the debate on AWS? The answer lies in applying the principle of equal moral worth.
In this context, Margalit and Walzer offer a helpful argument. Using an illuminating thought-exercise, they argue that when armed forces operate, they must assume the same level of risk -when choosing means and methods of warfare -whether operating in the vicinity of the enemy's civilians or among their own. 93 We do not claim that states cannot prefer their own civilians across the board. As David Luban convincingly notes, the issue is not whether states can 89 Ibid., 301-313. 90 Ibid., 300-301. 91 Ibid., 300. 92 105 demonstrates, too, a shift from a perception of warfare as a series of reciprocal blows between black-boxed sovereigns, into a more complex phenomenon, in which some diagonal responsibility is established between sovereigns and the adversary's civilians.
The same administrative law approach can be derived from IHRL, which is also considered applicable during armed conflict and -in some cases, extraterritorially. 106 IHRL requires that the limitation or deprivation of rights, including the right to life, be subject to due process in the course of limiting those rights. 107 As the ECtHR asserted, 'the decision-making process leading to measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests of the individual. 
B. Autonomous Weapons and the Problem of Pre-bound Discretion
As noted above, positive IHL requires belligerents to take 'constant care' to spare civilians. 116 'Constant care' is an admittedly vague standard, and as such open to various interpretations, lenient as well as constraining. Precisely here, the administrative law perception can guide us, as it allows us to understand properly this notion as a requirement to exercise continuous discretion when conducting hostilities. 117 The obligation to exercised discretion imposes upon the administrative authority the duty to consider, within the confines of its legal authority, each decision to exercise power in light of the specific goals of the norm that the executive is bound to promote, including the relevant rights and interests affected in the case at hand. This obligation calls for a duty to constantly exercise discretion. Of course, this duty implies a prohibition -and indeed the invalidityon fettering one's discretion. The authorizing agency must be willing to listen to 'anyone with something new to say' and to alter or waive its policies in appropriate cases. 118 The very idea of delegating decision-making authority to actors is to have them exercise their discretion in individual cases given the specific circumstances of each case. If there was no need to pay attention to the specific circumstances and to allow for fresh thinking, the superior organ could have made the decision itself. While some pre-commitment by administrative agencies is indeed a legitimate tool to promote transparency and equal treatment, it seeks to stipulate the boundaries of discretion, not to negate it altogether; moreover, pre-commitment must be of such nature that be altered in real-time if circumstances require. 119 Indeed, the fundamental requirement that discretion cannot be fettered is also reflected in general doctrines of international law, through the concept of 'reasonableness' (or in IHL language, of 'feasibility'). 120 The mere idea of reasonableness must require leaving open the possibility to make adjustments in one's policies, through the exercise of discretion. For instance, the international law of non-navigational use of watercourses requires upstream states to make 'equitable and reasonable' use of trans-boundary water sources. 121 It seems obvious that a state's attempt to predetermine what would be 'reasonable' use in all circumstances, and to act upon such criteria without reviewing them according to changing circumstances, will be a clear violation of the reasonableness principle. 122 If there could be a clear a-priori definition of what is to be considered 'reasonable', the parties would have agreed on it in advance.
There are two key rationales for the obligation not to fetter one's discretion. The first emanates from the rights of the affected individual. The executive is bound to give 'due respect' to individuals, by considering the effects of a specific act on individuals, in light of prevailing circumstances. 123 This is an essential characteristic of the trust relations which form the basis of administrative power, one which is especially significant in the context of hazardous activities, such as warfare. 124 The second justification for the duty to exercise discretion has to do with decision-making quality: we assume that in the long run, 'good' executive decisions cannot be taken, in a complex world, without making constant adjustments. 125 These adjustments, which require constant discretion, are necessary due to epistemological human limitations, which Hart identified as comprising 'relative ignorance of fact' and 'relative indeterminancy of aim.' 126 These 'handicaps' limit any attempt to regulate decision-making in advance. 127 During hostilities, the duty to exercise discretion requires the active, ongoing intention not to inflict harm on civilians. 128 The components of this duty require the military commander to exercise discretion both when planning the attack, 129 and, importantly, during attacks, up to the last moment before pulling the trigger. 130 Naturally, the last requirement applies primarily to 'those executing' the attack. 131 In our context, in an out-of-the-loop scenario, the duty to exercise discretion 'in the last moment' would have to be performed by the AWS.
This outcome is problematic when taking into account proper administrative discretion. AWS, as aforementioned, are only capable of exercising technical autonomy; they cannot engage in the metacognition required in order to exercise 'true' discretion in real-time. Therefore, their use reflects a case where executive discretion is stringently bound in advance -through the preprogrammed algorithms that govern their 'behaviour'. The deployment of AWS thus runs counter to the two rationales justifying the prohibition on fettering one's administrative discretion -respect for the individual and decision-making quality.
First, pre-binding targeting decisions, for instance, clearly contradicts the notion of 'due respect' for the individual, since the potentially harmed individual is not considered at all in real-time, but is rather 'factored' in pre-determined processes.
Second, AWS cannot be reconciled with the inherent need to make constant adjustments in a complex world, considering the epistemological limitations rules, taken as a whole, is likely to diminish the overall quality of decisionmaking, or worse -can potentially bring about catastrophic results. The latter problem can be easily demonstrated in the context of autonomous targeting. For instance, while a human administrator (or commander) is prone to make an occasional 'wrong' decision, her decision is unique and affects the specific case at hand. Even if she is in the higher organizational (or command) echelons, her decision can still (at least in theory) be corrected by judgment exercised by subordinates. Arguably, the diversity of human discretion is mutually correcting, ultimately leading to reasonable overall results. 133 Conversely, decisions based on 'wrong' algorithms, or, for that matter, on any pre-determined rigid rule, will be repeated by all systems in which they are embedded, to potential catastrophic effects. 134 While it is relevant to ask whether the life-saving potential of 'good'
AWS is not sufficient to outweigh such concerns, one should not lose sight of the catastrophic potentials of a systemic mistake.
In a sense, computerized pre-commitment constitutes a significant shift in the 'vertical landscape' of discretion. If IHL requires common sense throughout the command chain -from the general all the way down to the private, the socalled 'discretion' embedded in AWS would probably represent mainly the preprogrammed perceptions of higher echelons. As such, it will negate field decisionmaking which is not only a legal requirement under IHL, but can also be carried out better. 135 Naturally, the importance of on the field decision-making (sometimes referred to as 'street-level' decision-making) increases in intensively 'discretionary' environments, which involve complex decision-making under uncertainty. 136 Most modern armed conflicts clearly constitute such environments.
A major pitfall in the instrumentalist arguments that defend AWS can be found precisely regarding the problem of discretion. In order to reassure us that a human still remains 'in the loop' -meaning, that discretion is indeed exercisedsome instrumentalists claim that the only salience of AWS is that human discretion takes place on a different temporal level. As they argue, human discretion is embedded into the system through the human discretion of the programmers. Granted, Schmitt and Thurnher reassure us that the 'decisive juncture' of human discretion is found at the point where the decision is made to deploy the weapon in specific circumstances. 139 However, this reassurance is not entirely convincing, for two reasons. First, it relies on the contestable assumption that commanders would be able to foresee how weapons would 'act,' at least in a manner sufficient to amount to the taking of 'constant care' to spare civilians.
Here lies a paradox: for the weapon's action to be predictable, it must be built to follow simple, rigid rules, which seems to mean that it would not be capable to perform IHL's complex standards to begin with. However, if it is unpredictablemeaning, that it attempts to apply complex standards in a changing environmentthen deploying it per se violates the duty to take constant care. Moreover, since humans tend to attribute to computers 'far more intelligence than they actually possess,' and are therefore unlikely to 'override' their decisions, 140 it is possible to envision a phenomenon of 'reliance-creep,' where the duty to take constant care will be 'delegated' more and more to the computer's pre-programmed discretion.
In this context, it is also unclear to what extent allowing autonomous systems to select and 'recommend' human targets would alleviate the problem of discretion, considering the 'automation bias' that may occur when human beings assess computerized recommendations.
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Second, even under Schmitt and Thurnher's approach, the fact remains that the last decision to use force will be made by the weapon, upon pre-bound discretion. Indeed, Schmitt and Thurnher suggest that systems would include methods of 'adjustment,' allowing commanders to 'dial up and down' values in order to accommodate specific circumstances. 142 If these adjustments can be made during all stages of the attacks, including up to the last minute -this might indeed solve the problem of pre-bound discretion. But then, it would be fair to ask whether such weapons can be considered autonomous to begin with.
In sum, the reading of relevant legal norms in light of administrative law notions, and specifically the duty to take constant care and thereby exercise discretion, results in the conclusion that technically autonomous weapon systems cannot be allowed to make final targeting decisions.
C. Subjecting Warfare to Administrative Law Standards and the Problem of PreBound Discretion: Possible Challenges
Indeed, the administrative law approach at large, as well as our emphasis on the problem of pre-bound discretion, can raise some challenges or objections.
However, as we briefly demonstrate, they are not sufficient to negate either of these ideas. 147 It could be argued that our approach is one of rule-consequentialism: it looks at the consequences promoted by a decision making process guided by certain rules. See B. Hooker, problem of pre-bound discretion. One possible objection could be that regular, 'dumb' weapons, such as artillery rounds or rockets, also reflect pre-bound discretion: indeed, once fired -upon the discretion of the shooter -there is no turning back. However, we reject this ad absurdum argument on two counts.
First, the time gap between the exercise of human discretion and the weapons'
impact, in the case of regular kinetic weapons, is usually negligible. Any change of circumstances between the last human decision and impact, such that would require re-engaging of discretion is unlikely (although not entirely impossible). This is not the case when deploying AWS, which by nature are expected to act in a relatively prolonged manner. 148 Second, a 'dumb' weapon does not presume to execute complex legal standards itself, but rather follows simple physical rules.
To begin with, these weapons do not attempt to make distinction or proportionality decisions. The dumbness of the artillery shell must be taken into account by its launcher, who is also responsible for the potentially unlawful outcomes. In contrast, the sophistication of the AWS nullifies its launcher's opportunity to exercise discretion.
A related claim could be that nonetheless, the essence of military discipline is that human soldiers, too, do not exercise discretion, but rather follow orders. As such, the argument goes, even today, warfare assumes fettering the discretion of soldiers through their subjection to superiors. However, military thinkers have long been aware that in practice, soldiers do exercise discretion, for better or for worse, even when receiving clear orders. 149 Normatively, it is clear that international law requires discretion even from the lowest-ranked soldier, decisions must be given the opportunity to be heard. 158 Of course, translating the right to be heard to the battlefield is not straightforward: it cannot be understood in the exact manner as the same obligation during peace. However, some parallels can still be made. For instance, the well-established prohibition on ordering that no quarter will be given 159 is essentially a duty to leave open -at least passivelythe option of surrender, when clearly expressed. The option of surrender is thus
akin to an open window for a primitive type of hearing: the surrendering combatant is letting the other side know that she has chosen her right to life over her right to participate in hostilities, 160 and therefore there are no longer grounds to exercise executive power against her.
Taking into account the objectives of IHL, it is safe to assume that increasing opportunities to surrender is a desired social good. This is so not only due to the individual human rights of troops, but also because maximizing the option to surrender minimizes the adversary's motivation to 'fight to the last drop.' The question thus arises whether AWS widen or narrow the window in which surrender is feasible. Importantly, this dilemma arises not only when AWS are deployed in the vicinity of civilians, but also in scenarios where civilians are not at all present.
It goes without saying that surrender is not always viable: it requires some physical proximity, and awareness of the enemy's presence. 161 Thus, the obligation to allow surrender can by no means be an absolute positive duty under IHL -as such a demand will virtually replace the doctrine of targeting under the hostilities paradigm, with the use of force continuum entrenched in IHRL.
However, bearing in mind the human rights of combatants, it is still worthwhile to consider the effect of technological advancements on the feasibility of the option to surrender. These have not been entirely linear. Interestingly, for centuries, the battlefield scenarios in which surrender remained a viable possibility have decreased in line with the development of technology. For instance, it was nearly always possible to surrender in a swordfight; it became harder to do so when fire 158 powder was introduced; and virtually impossible in the era of ballistic weapons and air warfare, at least in most circumstances. 162 However, at least in some situations, the advent of smart technology can potentially reverse this trend, since weapons (and delivery platforms) can be controlled almost until final impact.
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Assuming that AWS would be deployed as replacement for ground forces, the question arises whether they will increase or decrease surrender opportunities.
Indeed, when a human is in control of the final decision to pull the trigger, there is a minimal time gap between discharging the weapon and impact: during this gap, Thus, if more and more maneuvers will be conducted through swarm attacks, it seems that the surrender window will be narrowed. 164 Of course, it is theoretically possible that technology be developed that does not narrow the window of surrender. However, we find this unlikely, since one of the key interests behind states' development of such weapons has to do with their quickness. In other words, narrowing the enemy's options on the temporal level is one of the key rationales for their development to begin with. See Krishnan, 'Killer Robots', pp. 40 -41. Furthermore, even if autonomous weapons be somehow designed as to not narrow the window of surrender, we will still run into the problem of pre-bound discretion. 165 Schmitt and Thurnher, 'Out of the Loop,' 240. 166 Address at BESA Center (9 October, 2013), http://besacenter.org/new-at-the-besa-center/idfchief-staff-benny-gantz-speaks-besa-center/.
gap between deployment and use of lethal force, the same gap in which surrender is theoretically possible. Thus, they might further reduce the temporal window for surrender. Second, the lightning-quickness of such weapons, when engaging, will not only challenge human supervision, but will also all but incapacitate the While the former is definitely true in cases where civilians might be at risk from such weapons, we have also advanced a preliminary argument regarding the deployment of AWS against combatants. As we claim, in line with the increasing calls to reconsider the traditional understanding of military necessity in relation to targeting combatants, the problem of discretion can arise also in this context.
Furthermore, AWS might also narrow the window of surrender, which we identify as a problematic outcome, at least in terms of de lege ferenda.
